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ABSTRACT  
Purpose: This article develops a cross-country analysis of the similarities and differences in the 
debt maturity structure of listed SMEs from the point of view of CG attributes in two different eco-
nomic environments: an OECD (Spain) country and a non-OECD (Argentina) country. 
Design/methodology/approach: Using data from listed SMEs in the Argentinian SME segment 
(pooled data from 2012 to 2015) and listed SMEs in the Spanish Mercado Alternativo Bursátil for 
growing firms (MAB_GE 2014), bivariate and multivariate analyses are performed.  
Findings: Spanish firms with a higher ownership concentration and a large controlling share-
holder have higher short-term liabilities (STL) ratios. Participation of women on the board has a 
negative relation with the STL ratio only for Spain. The participation of corporations in owner-
ship and a Big4 auditor have a negative relation with the STL ratio for both countries. 
Practical implications: These results will help SME managers understand the effects of the ap-
plication of good governance policies. The study also gives regulators a guideline to develop 








Originality/value:   First, the results provide evidence about the financial impact on the STL ratio 
of CG attributes in listed SME. Second, as far as the authors know, this is the first article to analyse 
the CG attributes of listed SMEs in an OECD country and a non-OECD country. Third, the paper 
presents CG data derived from an ad hoc basis elaborated from different websites and databases. 
Keywords:  corporate governance, SMEs, financial management, OECD country and non-OECD 
country 
Article Classification: Research paper  
1. INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of research has begun to analyse the impact of applying corporate governance 
(CG) recommendations to SMEs. The recent financial crisis has forced SMEs to look for new 
forms of finance as an alternative to bank financing, which is the main reason why alternative 
equity and fixed income markets are growing in many developed and developing economies 
(Young et al., 2008). The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (PCG-1999-2004-2015) try 
to respond to CG developments to reflect the experiences of OECD and non-OECD countries. A 
cross-country analysis of similarities and differences in the debt maturity structure (DMS) of 
listed SMEs from the point of view of the CG of two economic environments is a topic that still 
has not been analysed. This comparison is of special interest given Argentina´s interest and pro-
spects of joining the OECD nearly in the future. The conclusions of this work are useful for this 
country and others that wish to follow this path. 
 In this introduction we will comment some characteristics of the studied countries. SMEs 
represent a very important part of the economy in almost every country in the world. In Spain, 







ing comes from capital markets, they are affected by the application of the PCG. These principles 
are actively applied by governments, policymakers, investors, firms, managements, and stake-
holders and have been adopted by the Financial Stability Forum as one of the Twelve Key Stand-
ards for Sound Financial Systems. 
In Spain, there is an international alternative equity market for growing enterprises 
(MAB_GE). This market belongs to and is operated by the Bolsas y Mercados Españoles Sistemas 
de Negociación, S.A. BMESN (2015) issued the General Rules of MAB_GE aimed at regulating 
the operation of a multilateral trading system with specific characteristics. Among the main regu-
lated aspects are three internal CG guidelines: i) the limited review of accounts every 6 months, 
ii) control of the figure of nominated advisors, and iii) the obligation to have a commission of 
independent auditors. According to this MAB_GE General Regulation (2015), the Spanish listed 
SMEs were not subject to CG guidelines until 9 March 2016 (Table 1).  
In Argentina, the National Securities Commission (NSC) regulations (2013) established 
the NSC SME Regime for companies wishing to issue securities representing equity or debt in 
the Argentine capital markets (Chapter VI, Title II). The SME segment of the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange (SME_BASE) is an alternative equity and fixed income market, and firms can obtain 
financing by the discounting of deferred payment checks, financial trusts, and the issuance of 
corporate bonds and shares. The information requirements are smaller for listed SMEs, regarding 
the presentation of quarterly financial statements and the exemption of the requirement to have an 
audit committee. Marketable securities included in this regime can be acquired only by qualified 
investors.  








There are not issued rules currently within or outside the OECD for SMEs, but the PCG 
have been adopted in some cases. Spain applies the EU’s rules and internal market recommenda-
tions. In Spain, the MAB_GE-listed firms must follow its own regulations on CG. In Argentina, 
the NSC requires firms to present a Corporate Governance Code (Res.NSC 606/12) based on the 
principle of comply or explain, but SMEs are exempted from this requirement. Klappler and 
Love (2004) provide evidence that the average firm-level CG is lower in countries with weaker 
legal systems. In addition, firm-level CG provisions matter more in countries with weak legal 
environments (Argentina is not included in this study). Siems and Alvarez-Macotela (2014) won-
der if the PCG, which were designed for developed and rich countries, can be adapted to less de-
veloped ones. 
According to Baker and Martin (2011), there are differences between countries that have a 
legal system based on civil law and those that apply common law. In the first one, the companies 
have more debt in the short term. Although Argentina and Spain have the same legal system, 
French civil law, the effectiveness of economic and financial institutions is higher in Spain, as 
shown by the CLEAR Opacity Index (Milken Institute 2009). Therefore, given the different eco-
nomic and institutional contexts of both countries, this paper focuses only on whether the coun-
tries belong to the group of OECD countries. 
The paper presented here attempts to answer the following research questions: i) Are there 
any differences in the corporate governance structures of listed SMEs in an OECD country (Spain) 
and a non-OECD country (Argentina)? If such differences do exist, ii) do these differential GC at-







We contribute to the literature as the following ways. First, we provide evidence about the 
financial impact on the short-term liabilities (STL) ratio of CG attributes in listed SME. Second, as 
far as the authors know, this is the first article to analyse the CG attributes of listed SMEs in an 
OECD country and a non-OECD country. Third, the paper presents CG data derived from an ad 
hoc basis elaborated from different websites and databases.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES  
2.1. Ownership concentration and the STL ratio 
Classical capital structure theory classifies DMS explanations into three categories: contracting 
costs, signalling hypotheses, and taxes (Barclay and Smith, 1995). In addition, macro-economic 
factors can also affect DMS (Caprio and Demirguc-Kunt 1998). In fact, in emerging countries, 
firms issue mostly short-term debt, in contrast to developed countries, where long-term debt pre-
dominates (Booth et al., 2001). For developed countries, some previous studies analyse the rela-
tionship of CG attributes and DMS. We find a group of studies based on large listed firms, e.g., 
Shyu and Lee (2009), Lee and Chan (2013) for Taiwan; García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano 
(2010) for Spain; Dasilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015) for Greece, and Iona and Leonida (2016), Iona, 
Leonida and Ventouri (2017) for UK, among others. A second group of studies analyses private 
unlisted SMEs, e.g. Díaz-Díaz, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano (2016) for Spain. Dasilas and 
Papasyriopoulos (2015) compare the impact of the corporate governance characteristic on the 
credit rating and capital structure of the listed large and SME Greek firms.  
 The CG attributes that are studied in OECD countries include ownership concentration, 
main shareholder participation, board structure and women as members of the board. For non-







DMS, and most of them are based on large public firms: Arslan and Karan (2006) for Turkey; 
Lemma and Negash (2012, 2016) for African countries; and Martins, Schiehll, and Terra (2017) 
for Brazil and Chile, among others. Briozzo, Albanese and Santoliquido, (2017) studied this rela-
tionship for Argentinean SMEs. 
 The CG characteristics that are studied in non-OECD economies include the ownership 
concentration and main shareholder participation. Young et al. (2008) observe that in emerging 
markets such as Latin American countries, there is another added conflict because a feature 
common of these economies is the great concentration of ownership in few individuals (or fami-
lies founder) and economic groups. The principal-principal conflict is raised, which arises be-
tween the representative manager of the controlling family and other outside investors. The im-
portance of a good CG is that it mitigates conflicts of interest between different participants of a 
firm and reduces information opacity (Klapper and Love, 2004; Garay and González, 2008; Bra-
ga Alvez and Shastri, 2011, Briozzo, Albanese and Santoliquido, 2017). 
Short-term debt can serve as an outside monitoring mechanism and can consequently re-
duce managerial discretion over the firm’s free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). A large shareholder can 
also act as a control mechanism to reduce the conflict of interest between insiders and outsiders 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Therefore, a negative substitution effect between monitoring by debt 
holders and large shareholders can emerge. That is, there should be a negative association be-
tween ownership concentration and short-term debt (Martins, Schiehll, and Terra, 2017). Accord-
ing to previous studies (Garcia-Teruel and Martínez-Solano 2010; in the UK, Marchica, 2008; 
and in Turkey, Arslan and Karan, 2006), the presence of large shareholders is negatively related 







Hypothesis 1a. The higher the percentage of ownership concentration by the largest 
shareholder, the lower the STL ratio is. 
However, the relationship between ownership concentration and debt maturity may not be 
linear. Ownership concentration can also induce expropriation effects for debt holders and minor-
ity shareholders (principal-principal conflicts). This problem is especially important in countries 
with low investor protection, such as Argentina and Spain, both of which are ruled by French 
civil law (La Porta et al., 1998). In this case, a large shareholder does not necessarily have a mon-
itoring role such as short-term debt. Therefore, “controlling owners may be interested in signal-
ling to the market their intention to mitigate potential agency costs by using short term debt” 
(García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010:476). Lee and Chan (2013), García-Teruel and Mar-
tinez-Solano (2010), and Martins et al. (2016), among others, find that the effect of ownership 
concentration on DMS is non-monotonic1.  On the one hand, it has a positive association with 
short-term debt for a high tenure for the largest shareholder. On the other hand, this relationship 
becomes negative at low ownership concentration levels. Consequently, we present the following 
hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1b (signalling). The higher the percentage of ownership concentration by the 
largest shareholder, the higher the STL ratio is for firms with a large shareholder with 
high participation. 
Hypothesis 1c (substitution effect between the control role of ownership concentration 
and STL). The higher the percentage of ownership concentration by the largest sharehold-
er, the lower the STL ratio is for firms with a large shareholder with low participation. 
                                                                







2.2. Corporation as main shareholder and the STL ratio 
Business group structures are a prevalent feature of developing countries (Young et al., 2008). 
The presence of business groups presents another channel through which controlling shareholders 
can expand control and expropriate wealth from minority shareholders (principal –principal con-
flicts). Short-maturity debt can be used as a monitoring device, given its frequent renewal, which 
exposes managers to the evaluation of banks and external investors (Stulz, 2000). Therefore, 
managers under a weak corporate governance structure will choose more long-term debt for the 
firm capital structure. Datta, Datta, and Raman (2005) report a statistically significant inverse 
relation between managerial stock ownership2 (a mechanism for aligning manager and owner 
incentives) and debt maturity. Managerial ownership is negatively related to the long-term debt 
ratio. Given the higher monitoring role of short-term debt, firms within business groups have an 
incentive to pursue long-term debt to avoid this control mechanism. According to Wen, Rwegasi-
ra, and Bilderbeek (2002), “managers tend to pursue lower financial leverage when they face 
stronger corporate governance from the board”. According to these arguments, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The participation of corporations in ownership (business group affiliation) 
has a negative relation with the STL ratio. 
2.3. Women as members of the board and the STL ratio 
Previous studies have found that gender diversity can positively affect boards’ efficiency, given 
women’s tendency for active monitoring (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Virtanen, 2012; Alves, Cou-
                                                                







to and Francisco, 2015), and improve financial performance (Gordon, Hrazdil and Shapiro, 
2012). Alves, Couto and Francisco (2015) find that a more gender-diversified board can lead to 
greater independence in the efficiency of the board of directors and, therefore, lead firms to rely 
more on long-term sources of funding. 
Spain, despite the importance of SMEs in its economy, has not enacted any laws or recom-
mendations so far regarding women and SMEs’ CG. Most of the gender studies and CG issues have 
focused on unlisted Spanish SMEs (Mínguez-Vera and López-Martínez, 2010, 2011; Berenguer, 
Giraldez-Puig and Cardone-Riportella, 2016, among others). To the best of our knowledge, no pre-
vious study has focused on the relationship between gender diversity and capital structure maturity 
in SMEs. Berenguer, Giraldez-Puig and Cardone-Riportella (2016) confirm the prudential charac-
ter of women as owners but find no significant results for women as board members. For Argen-
tina, Briozzo, Albanese and Santoliquido (2017) find evidence of relations among different levels 
of CG and gender diversity. Therefore, we expect that a substitution effect exists between women 
directors and the of STL, as the control women directors exert replace the monitoring role of 
STL. Thus, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 3. The participation of women on the board has a negative relation with the 
STL ratio. 
2.4 Financial statement quality and the STL ratio 
Information disclosure is one of the pillars of good CG practices, among other reasons, because 
the asymmetric information present in the case of SMEs restricts access to external financing 







In this sense, the following studies give us useful information. Mallin and Ow-Yong 
(2012) analysed the formal CG aspects in terms of disclosures in the admission document put for-
ward by the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) firms coming to market. The authors also ana-
lyse the role of the nominated advisor and nominated broker. Shell and highly geared AIM firms’ 
disclosure exhibits relatively lower levels of CG than recommended by the guidelines. For the au-
thors, the main disincentive to disclose non-mandatory information is potential property cost as the 
benefits for the competitors of this information. Parsa and Kouhy (2008) focus on the impact of the 
disclosure social information of listed firms on the AIM. Among the main results, they find that, 
contrary to the general opinion, SMEs report social information, regardless of their financial situa-
tion, because they value the impact of this disclosure of market social reports, which help preserve 
their corporate reputation.  
The external auditor has a key role for external users of financial statements. For Van 
Caneghem and Van Campenhout (2010), both the level of detail and the quality of the information 
disseminated in the financial statements of Belgian companies are positively related to the level of 
indebtedness. Auditing services provided by a Big4 auditing firm have been considered a proxy 
for audit quality (Van Caneghem and Campenhout, 2010). Moreover, the long-term debt ratio 
increases (or STL ratio decreases) with the presence of a Big4 auditor, “suggesting that higher-
quality audits substitute for short-term debt for monitoring purposes” (El Ghoul et al. 2016:718).  
Therefore, the disclosure of social reports, the application and disclosure of standards of 
good governance and the disclosure of auditing services provided by quality audit firms can in-








Hypothesis 4. Firms with a Big4 auditor have a lower STL ratio. 
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Data 
We use the following data sets: 
- Argentinian SMES_BASE data (25 firms) regard the CG characteristics for the year of 
the issue prospectus (from 2012 to 2015). Financial data are derived on an ad hoc ba-
sis elaborated from website information. For the multivariate analysis, the number of 
firms with full data decreases from 25 to 193. 
- Spanish MAB_GE data (31 firms) correspond to the latest available database used 
(2014). We collected the information from the following databases4. i) Data on the 
board of director characteristics were obtained from the SABI database 
(https://sabi.bvdinfo.com/version-2016418/home.serv?product=sabineo) and ii) 
MAB_GE website. For the multivariate analysis, the number of firms with full data 
goes from 31 to 30 firms. 
For both countries, the studied populations include companies from all industries except 
financial services due to their different financial reporting requirements and financial structure. 
We analyse one-year data because GC attributes present few variations in the mid-term, and in-
formation on some GC attributes for Argentina is not available periodically.  
                                                                
3The variable with missing data for Argentina is number of employees, which is a measure of firm size. We per-
formed the Little's test of missing completely at random (MCAR) for the employee’s variable, and we obtained a p-
value of 0.2605, which means that the null hypothesis of MACR cannot be rejected. Thus, we keep using the listwise 
deletion method, given that it does not introduce bias when the data are missing completely at random (MCAR). 
4 The Spanish Fixed Income Market is not considered in this study because this alternative capital market was estab-








Given the novelty of SME financing via capital markets, the number of companies trading 
in these markets is still very small. Except the two pioneer countries in opening alternative markets 
for SMEs (UK and Canada), alternative capital markets have from 2 to 48 firms in Latin American 
non-OECD countries, and from 14 to 187 firms in OECD countries. It must be noted that the small 
number of firms available for the analysis corresponds to the small size of the populations under 
study, and that our results represent these populations. Small sample problems of inference of the 
results to the population are no present here because we study the whole population.. 
3.2. Variables 
3.2.1. Dependent Variable  
Short-term liability ratio (STL/TL). We measure DMS as the short-term liabilities to total liabili-
ties. Given that both debt and corporate governance can mitigate agency costs (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976; Jensen 1986), a substitution effect between both mechanisms can be expected. Empir-
ical evidence for this inverse relation is reported by several prior studies in listed firms (Wen, 
Rwegasira, and Bilderbeek. 2002; Jiraporn et al., 2012). These independent variables are meas-
ured simultaneously with the dependent variables because we are working with one-year data. 
3.2.2. Independent Variables 
The variables used to represent the four measurable and available corporate governance attributes 
are as follows. 
1.-Ownership Concentration (OC). This is the percentage of ownership of all shares owned by 
the main shareholder of the firm. This variable is included in most models of CG and firm per-







large shareholder dummy (LSD) that takes a value of 1 if the largest shareholder owns 50% of 
more of the firm shares. 
2.-Participation of corporations in ownership (business groups) (PCO). Number of corporations 
that are shareholders as a percentage of total shareholders, as a proxy for business groups affilia-
tion.  
3.-Number of Woman in the board (WBOARD). Percentage of female directors on the board.  
4.-Auditing by one of the Big4 Audit firms (Big4). Measure of whether last year the firm has been 
audited by one of the world’s largest audit firms, which are currently KPMG, Deloitte, Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers and Ernst & Young. 
3.2.3. Control Variables 
In addition to the explanatory variables, we include controls for other firm-level characteristics 
that, according to previous studies, may contribute to explaining firms’ DMS. 
1.-Number of Board Directors (NBOARD). A large board is associated with an ineffective moni-
toring role (Salloum, Azoury and Azzi, 2013), which can facilitate that managers avoid debt ma-
turity structures that enable frequent monitoring (STL).  
2.-Firm Size (LSALES). This variable relates to possible economy-of-scale effects. Larger firms 
face lower information asymmetries, which can facilitate long-term debt financing (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). The variable is measured as the natural logarithm of sales. Empirical studies 
generally support this expected relationship (e.g., Datta, Datta, and Raman, 2005; Marchica 2008, 
Diaz-Diaz, García-Teruel, and Martínez-Solano, 2016), although some have found the opposite 







3.-Firm Size (FIRMSIZE). We also included the total number of employees of the firm as a con-
trol variable.  
4.-Firm Age (AGE). This variable relates to changes caused by a firm’s life cycle changes. This 
variable is used to control the level of experience and accumulated resources. It is measured as 
the number of years a firm has been in existence, and it is expected to exert a positive influence 
on the long-term debt (Scherr and Hulburt, 2001).  
5.-Sector (SEC). We use the industrial sector as a proxy for the asset maturity structure5. There 
are some differences across the industrial sectors. Those firms that belong to the innovation and 
development sector are more prone to enter MAB_GE because they require greater capital inten-
sity. Firms in the services sector are expected to face higher information asymmetries than are 
manufacturing firms due to the low investment in fixed tangible assets, which leads to greater use 
of short-term debt. Previous studies have found that the ratio of fixed assets to total assets is posi-
tively related to long-term debt (Arslan and Karan, 2006; Lee and Chang 2013, Diaz-Diaz, Gar-
cía-Teruel, and Martínez-Solano, 2016). 
6.-Leverage (LEV). This variable is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. Highly 
leveraged firms will seek to control financial risk through longer maturity (Diamond, 1993). Di-
az-Diaz et al. (2016) report a positive association between leverage and the long-term debt ratio.  
7.-Growth Opportunities (GRO). This variable is defined as the accumulated growth rate in total 
sales during the two previous years, to proxy for a firm's growth opportunities and hence the se-
verity of underinvestment problems and the need for the control role of short-term liability (Diaz-
                                                                
5 We do not use the traditional proxy of asset maturity through the ratio of fixed assets to total assets or depreciation, 







Diaz, García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2016). Moreover, STL can act as a signal of good pro-
spects for growing firms (Martins et al., 2016). Barclay and Smith (1995) find that high-growth 




First, we analyse the differences in GC attributes between both countries. In this bivariate 
analysis we use the two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test for continuous varia-
bles (a non-parametric test), and Fisher Exact and Pearson chi-squared tests6 for binary variables. 
To study the relationships between CG attributes in each country (correlation structure), a 
bivariate analysis is carried out. The Spearman correlation coefficient (a non-parametric test) by 
ranges is used for pairs of continuous variables (e.g., the size of the company and of the board of 
directors). The point biserial correlation coefficient and Mann-Whitney test are used to analyse a 
continuous variable vs. a binary variable (e.g., Big4 auditor and women on board). Estimations 
are made using StataSE 13. 
In the multivariate analysis using least squares regression we test each GC variable indi-
vidually, to avoid the loose of degrees of freedom and minimize the risk of multicollinearity. 
Then we run a model that includes all the explanatory GC variables simultaneously for Spanish 
firms, which represent the larger population. We use different diagnostics checks: the variance 
                                                                
6 The Mann–Whitney U test (also called the Mann–Whitney–Wilcoxon test) is a nonparametric test used to test 
whether two samples are likely to derive from the same population. Fisher's exact test is a statistical significance test 
used in the analysis of contingency tables, which can be used with small samples. Pearson's chi-squared test is a 
statistical test applied to sets of categorical data to evaluate how likely it is that any observed difference between the 







inflation factor (VIF) to check for multicollinearity, the White test and Breusch-Pagan test to 
check for the homoscedasticity of the residuals, the Ramsey RESET test and Link test to check 
for misspecification errors, and analysis of the standardized residuals to identify the influence of 
outliers. Outliers are excluded. It is important to note that the small number of firms available for 
the analysis responds to the small size of the populations under study, and therefore our results 
are representative of these populations. 
4. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
4.1. Corporate Governance attributes 
In this section, we analyse the differences and similarities in CG characteristics for the two coun-
tries. First, we present the descriptive statistics of the sample (Table 2).  
Insert Table 2 about here 
Tables 3 and 4 show a comparison of the countries, and the relation between CG variables 
for each country individually. The high ownership concentration observed in Argentina is in line 
with previous studies for Latin America (Cespedes, González, and Molina, 2010). Spanish com-
panies hire a greater proportion of Big4 Auditing firms, a feature that is practically absent in Ar-
gentina. Regarding control variables, Argentinean firms are older and larger (considering em-
ployees and sales). The difference for assets and leverage should be interpreted carefully due to 
inflation distortions in accounting data for Argentina7. Argentinean firms have a higher STL ra-
tio, as expected in an emerging country, with a weak legal system and high corruption (Turk 
                                                                
7. The International Accounting Standard 29 (IAS 29, Financial Reporting in Hyperinflationary Economies) de-
scribes as a quantitative characteristic of the existence of hyperinflation a three-year cumulative inflation rate ex-
ceeding 100%. The cumulative inflation rate in Argentina is close to or above this limit depending on the consulted 
source. However, inflation accounting is suspended in Argentina since 2003. It must be noted that inflation distor-







Ariss, 2016). The difference for growth (GRO) can be explained mostly by the high inflation pro-
cess present in Argentina since 2007.8 Spanish firms have larger boards, higher participation of 
corporations as shareholders, and lower concentration in the hands of the main shareholder. Since 
there are no previous studies in Spain for these firms, we cannot comment on whether the same 
or different behaviour occurs.  
Insert Tables 3 and 4 about here 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show that the relationship between CG variables is different for both coun-
tries. In Argentina (Table 5), statistically significant results appear for the direct relation between 
the percentage of shareholders that are corporations (PCO) and the ownership concentration 
(OC). This result shows the ownership structure of business groups in Argentina. 
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here 
 
In Spain (Table 5), board size is negatively related with main shareholder ownership. In-
terestingly, female participation on the board is positively related to economic groups (participa-
tion of corporations in ownership, PCO). A Big4 auditor is positively related to ownership con-
centration. Finally, a higher concentration of property, which implies greater risks for minority 
shareholders, can be compensated with higher quality informative if firms are being auditing by 
one of the Big4 auditing firms.  
4.2. Corporate governance impact on the STL ratio 
                                                                
8 In the multivariate analysis, we do not include total assets (TA) as a control variable due to the levels of inflation 







We analyse the effects of CG attributes on the STL ratio for Argentina and Spain (Table 7). Giv-
en the small nature of the populations, a set of different model specifications was estimated for 
each explanatory variable to check the robustness of the results.9 
For both countries we observe a non-significant effect of ownership concentration on the 
STL ratio (Table 7 M1), thus we find no support for H1 and H1a. This result remains unchanged 
after controlling for large shareholder dummy (M2).  However, when running the model includ-
ing all GC variables simultaneously for Spanish firms only (M6), ownership concentration for 
enterprises with a large shareholder with high participation shows a positive relation with the 
STL ratio, as expected by H1b (signalling hypothesis). This effect is consistent with Lee and 
Chan (2013), García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2010), and Martins et al. (2016).  
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
For Argentina and Spain (M3), participation in business groups (other corporations 
as4shareholders) has a negative effect on the STL ratio, which gives support to H210. M4 and M6 
in Table 7 show the negative effect of the participation of women on the board for Spanish firms, 
which brings support for H3.  Then, we analyse the effect of a Big4 auditor on STL ratio  (M5 
Table 7). The results show a strong negative effect of Big4 auditor for both countries, which 
gives support to H4.  
                                                                
9 The significance of the individual-level results is robust to different model specifications and the incorporation of 
control variables. For space reasons, in this section, we show only the estimations for independent variables with 
significant results (one estimated model for each GC attribute) and we also include a model with all GC variables for 
Spanish firms. Data is available upon request. 
10 This relation is robust, even after controlling for the main shareholder ownership concentration. Different specifi-







Regarding M6 in Table 7, which shows the results for the joint estimation of the GC vari-
ables for Spanish firms, it must be noted that besides the result for ownership concentration, par-
ticipation of women in the board (WBOARD) shows the same sign and significance as M4 in 
Table 7.  However, the risk of multicollinearity is high as shown by the VIF, which in addition to 
the lack of degrees of freedom can explain the loose of statistical significance at individual level 
for the other GC variables (Big 4 and PCO).  Finally, for control variables we observe that firm 
size measured by number of employees has a positive effect in all estimated models. 
4.3 Discussion 
As a summary, in Spain, the ownership structure (main shareholder concentration and 
corporations as shareholders) has a positive effect on the STL ratio when a large shareholder with 
high participation exits. We do not find support for a U-shaped relationship between ownership 
concentration and DMS, as found by previous studies. The presence of corporations as share-
holders, a proxy for the participation of business groups, has a negative effect on the STL ratio in 
both countries (H2). This can be interpreted as a way to avoid the monitoring role of STL, but 
also it shows that firms within business groups have access to long-term credit because of the 
backup that the business group gives. Regarding the effects of the participation of women on the 
board for Spanish firms, we find a significant negative effect, which brings partial support for 
H3. This result is in favour of promoting gender diversity in firm boards. Finally, the effect of a 
Big4 auditor has a strong negative effect on the STL ratio for both countries, which gives support 
to H4. Our findings support the view that the financial statements of companies that are not au-







We can conclude that the influence of CG attributes on DMS varies among countries, the 
results support H1b (ownership concentration under de signalling hypothesis) only for Spain, H2 
(corporations as shareholders) and H4 (Big4) for both countries, and H3 (women participation on 
board) only for Spain. Regarding the result for ownership concentration in Spain, it is worth to 
note that in a country where atomized property is more frequent, the signalling effect of a large 
shareholder arises as a significant influence compared to Argentina. The participation of women 
in the board is significant only for Spain, a country with more developed gender legislation than 
Argentina. These differences between countries can be explained by the diverse economic and 
institutional environments: weaker legal system, higher corruption, differential regulations, and a 
high inflation process present in Argentina. 
5. CONCLUSIONS  
The firm´s capital structure is one of the topics of corporate finance that continues to con-
cern researchers, basically the study of the determinants of firms´capital structure. Several studies 
have been carried out in order to analyse the determinants of capital structure. In the particular 
case of the SME, the objective of this paper is to analyse which aspects of corporate governance 
policy influence on the DMS. The empirical literature on corporate governance and financial de-
cisions mainly refers to large firms and unlisted SMEs. We analysed the following attributes of 
the CG mechanism: property structure (ownership concentration and corporations as main share-
holders); the participation of women on the board, and the intervention of a Big4 in external audit 
functions.  
The study focusses specifically on the case of listed SMEs, since there are scarce studies 







In many countries, the recent financial crisis has led SMEs to seek alternatives to bank financing 
through alternative capital markets. Additionally, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 
try to respond to CG developments in OECD countries. As far as we know, it is not observed in 
the literature many works that address the listed SME´s corporate government in non-OECD 
countries. A cross-country analysis of similarities or differences on the capital structures of listed 
SMEs from the point of view of the CG of two economic environments: Argentina, a non-OECD 
country, and Spain an OECD country are analysed. Both countries have alternative investment 
markets for SMEs with a similar trajectory, while the characteristics of the companies that partic-
ipate there are similar as well. 
Our results are relevant to SME owners and managers because they suggest that the adop-
tion of good governance practices, which are costly in nature, are offset by the cost savings of 
long-term financing to which they have access. In the same way, the application of good govern-
ance practices, transmit confidence to capital markets, which translates into higher participation 
of investors.  According to Desilas and Papasyriopoulos (2015), these agents seek the balance 
between capital and debt in the long-term in order to guarantee the viability of the company, 
while recognizing that the influence of CG attributes on the capital structure of Greek listed 
SMEs is less evident compared with large firms. The authors attribute this to the active involve-
ment of owners in the management of SMEs, which reduces the need for shareholders to bear the 
costs of monitoring agents. 
 This study also provides regulators with information for developing standards that help 
efficient borrowing in terms of seeking funding in alternative capital markets rather than borrow-







in other countries (e.g., Canada), flexible regulatory standards may be preferable because not all 
rolls are appropriate for all firms according to Gordon, Hrazdil, and Shapiro (2012).  
This study allows us to ask as a future research question if the impact of the CG policy on 
the capital structure affects listed and non-listed Spanish SMEs in a same or different way. In 
addition, it could be analysed whether the behaviour of the SMEs in relation to the application of 
CG policies, changes in times of prosperity compared to times of financial crises. 
A limitation of this study is the numbers of firms included in the analysis. Capital alterna-
tive markets are very news, so the number of firms trading in these markets is still very small. An-
other limitation of this study is that (because of data restrictions) the one-year nature of the analy-
sis does not allow us to consider dynamic effects on the DMS; this could be an interesting avenue 
for further research.  
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Geographic and temporal context 
 Argentina Spain 
SME definition  The Argentinian Secretary of Entrepreneurship and Small and 
Medium Enterprises defines the maximum amount of annual 
sales to be considered an SME, based on annual sales and 
sector of activity. The current legislation at the time of the 
study was Resolution 11/2016, which establishes a maximum 
annual sale of 33.75 for industry and mining, trade 40.63 
11.25 services, construction and 10 agricultural 16.88 (in 
millions of euros, exchange rate peso-euro average $/€ 16 for 
the first semester of 2016). 
European Union Recommendation 2003/361/EC  
“The category of SMEs is made up of enterprises 
which employ fewer than 250 persons and which 
have an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million 
euro, and/or an annual balance sheet total not 
exceeding 43 million euro.” 
 
SMEs in the country 
economy 
In Argentina, 99.7% of the companies are micro, small or 
medium enterprises. Together, they generate 70% of private 
registered employment (Cabrera, 2016). 
In the EU-28, on average, 99.8% of total firms 
generate around 60% of the gross value added and 
employ nearly of 70% of the total employment 
(EUROSTAT, 2015). 
SMEs Bank financing In Argentina 37.9% of small firms (fewer than 20 employees) 
and 58.9% of medium firms (20 to 99 employees) have a bank 
loan or line of credit. (World Bank Enterprise Surveys, 2010). 
 
On average 70% of the EU-SMEs are dependent on 
bank financing. In Spain, the percentage is 80%. In 
Asia 50% and in USA 20% (BME, 2016). 
Alternative Capital 
Markets 
Argentinean SME segment of Buenos Aires Stock Exchange 
(SME_BASE). 
 
Mercado Alternativo Bursátil - Empresas en Creci-
miento y Mercado Español de Renta Fija (MERF). 
CG rules NSC requires listed firms to present a Corporate Governance 
Code (Res.NSC 606/12) based on the principle of comply or 
explain.  SMEs are exempted from this requirement. 
General Rules for MAB_GE.: i) the limited review 
of accounts every 6 months, ii) control of the figure 
of nominated advisors, and iii) the obligation to 
have a commission of independent auditors. 
Legal system French Civil Law                                                                           French Civil Law 
Inflation rate (*) 33.48% (2013-2016 annual average) 
 
0.125% (2013-2016 annual average) 
 
Opacity Index  
Milken Institute (2009), 




World Bank Development indicators for Spain, 
26 
Source: Authors Elaboration. (*) Instituto Provincial de Estadística de San Luis for Argentina. World Bank Development indica-
tors for Spain. (**) The opacity index varies from 0 to 100; a higher value indicates higher opacity. The Opacity Index is com-
posed of the following indicators: C: Corruption, L: Legal System, E: Enforcement, A: Exposure and accounting standards, and R: 
Regulatory quality. In all cases, a higher value indicates poorer quality of the measured variable. Source: Milken Institute (2009), 






Mean St. dev Min Max Mean St. dev Min Max 
Dependent variable: STL/ TL 84.71% 17.8% 26.7% 100.0% 56.97% 18.6% 23.4% 86.5% 
WBOARD 19.02% 23.3% 0.0% 66.7% 9.63% 10.7% 0.0% 33.3% 
OC 57.42% 27.1% 22.5% 99.9% 41.33% 25.2% 5.0% 99.9% 
PCO 24.61% 33.8% 0.0% 100.0% 67.78% 26.0% 0.0% 100.0% 
NBOARD 3.475 0.82 3.00 5.00 6.545 2.8 3.0 14.0 
AGE (years) 19.5 15.90 8.00 72.00 13.2 7.84 1 30.67 
LSALES (thousand euros) 9.17 1.16 7.09 12.00 7.67 2.59 0.43 11.32 
FIRMSIZE (Number of employ-
ees) 
144.66 288.24 25.00 1337 89.53 140.6 2.0 511.0 







LEV 65.67% 13.1% 43.2% 86.1% 54.78% 24.0% 1.4% 88.7% 
GRO 75.90% 85.1% -45.3% 378.1% 55.18% 132.6% -99.9% 514.6% 




Characterization of continuous Corporate Governance and control variables 
 
Variables Argentina Spain P-value 
Dependent variable: STL/ TL 84.71% 56.97% 0.000 
Independent variables 
WBOARD 19.02% 9.63% 0.176 
OC 57.42% 41.33% 0.013 
PCO 24.61% 67.78% 0.000 
Control variables 
NBOARD 3.475 6.545 0.000 
AGE (years) 19.5 13.2 0.038 
LSALES (thousand euros) 9.17 7.67 0.114 
FIRMSIZE (Number of employees) 144.66 89.53 0.023 




75.90% 55.18% 0.009 
FIRMAGE (years) 
19.8 13.2 0.0215 




Characterization of binary Corporate Governance and control variables 
Variables Argentina Spain P-value Test 
Dependent variables 
BIG4 4.00% 33.33% 0.001 Fisher Exact 
MSC  0.00% 61.29% 0.000 Fisher Exact 
LSD 60.98% 45.71% 0.183 Pearson 
Control variables 







Note: The presence of the characteristic is shown for each country. P-values are from the Fisher Exact or Pearson test according to the structure of 





Correlation matrix for Corporate Governance data for Argentina 
 
 
 OC NBOARD WBOARD PCO  
OC 1     
NBOARD -0.2016 1    
WBOARD -0.1299 -0.0688 1   
PCO 0.4824** -0.1153 -0.1558 1  
Note: Big4 calculations not available due to estimation problems for small size samples. The Spearman correlation is computed 
for pairs of continuous variables. The point biserial correlation is computed for a pair of binary variables with a continuous varia-
ble. * notes statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level 
 
TABLE 6 
Correlation matrix for Corporate Governance data for Spain 
 
 OC NBOARD WBOARD PCO BIG4+ 
OC 1     
NBOARD -0.5363*** 1    
WBOARD 0.2981 0.197 1   
PCO 0.2467 0.1257 0.3582* 1  
BIG4+ 
         0.493** -0.259 0.097 -0.111 1 
Note: + denotes binary variables. The Spearman correlation is computed for pairs of continuous variables. The point biserial 
correlation is computed for a pair of binary variables with a continuous variable. * notes statistical significance at the 10% level, 







Joint estimations of GC attributes effect on DMS 
 
Variables M1   M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 (Spain) 
OC (COUNTRY=ARG) -0.122 
     
 
OC (COUNTRY=SP) 0.155 





    
  
LSD=1 -0.293 
    OC (COUNTRY=SP) 
 
LSD=0 0.312 




   
0.383* 
PCO (COUNTRY=ARG) 





















    
 -0.689** 
 
   -0.834** 
BIG 4(COUNTRY=ARG) 
     
  -0.498*** 
 
BIG4(COUNTRY=SP)} 
     
  -0.292*** 0.006 
BIG4 
    
 -0.135** 
  FIRMSIZE 0.062*** 
 














 CONST 0.614*** 
 
0.737*** 0.601*** 0.555*** 0.661*** 0.387** 
N 49 
 
49 49 49 49 30 
Prob>F 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adj R2 0.594 
 
0.473 0.379 0.422 0.389 0.399 
Mean VIF 1.480 
 
- 2.420 1.700 1.370 2.640 
White's general test (p-value) 0.622 
 
0.586 0.638 0.166 0.514 0.411 
Breush-Pagan (p-value) 0.830 
 
0.779 0.854 0.748 0.726 0.827 
Ramsey RESET test (p-value) 0.202 
 
0.638 0.324 0.117 0.319 0.737 
Link Test (p-value) 0.148 
 
0.400 0.184 0.362 0.532 0.785 
Standarized residuals 




   -1.99;1.79    -1.98;1.95   -1.98;1.91   -1.77;1.69 
 
 
Note: Variables named Country=Arg show the effect of the variable for Argentina, while those named Country=Sp 
show the effect for Spain. M6 estimates only for Spain. Results from the least squares regression. Statistical signifi-
cance is noted with * at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level, and *** at the 1% level. N: number of firms. Link test 
shows the p-value of the prediction squared in the STL regression.. Regressions controlled for outliers. 
